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THE PRISONER IN A PRIVATE 
HOSPITAL SETTING: WHAT 
PROVIDERS SHOULD KNOW 
JEFFREY NATTERMAN* & PAMELA RAYNE** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prisoner health care rights have long been debated, and accordingly, 
there are countless journal articles and judicial decisions describing their 
various nuances.1 Despite the scholarship that has penetrated various issues 
confronting prisoner medical management, one under-reported subject area 
requires further exploration. The privately hospitalized prisoner-patient is 
clinically managed based on the same standard of medical care established 
for the general population, but the prison context presents additional 
complicating factors.2  
Medical providers are expected to follow ethical clinical practice 
guidelines established by national medical societies, and base their practices 
on well-established, evidenced-based metrics. The American Medical 
Association (“AMA”) has long established a code of ethics that supports 
not only competent medical care for the general population,3 but has 
recently advocated for the civil rights of prisoners seeking medical 
treatment.4 Nonetheless, for the hospitalized patient in custody, several 
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 1. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HEALTH IN PRISONS: A WHO GUIDE TO THE 
ESSENTIALS IN PRISON HEALTH 7–8, 33–41 (Lars Moller et al. eds., 2007) (describing the steps 
prisons should take to reduce health risks); Joseph E. Paris, Why Prisoners Deserve Health Care, 
10 AMA J. ETHICS 2, 113–15 (Feb. 2008), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2008/02/msoc1-
0802.html (describing legal and ethical reasons for providing health care to prisoners). 
 2. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 150–51 (3d ed. 
2007). 
 3. AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2001), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-
ethics.page. 
 4. In Fields v. Smith, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) in an amicus brief 
supported the rights of prisoners to obtain hormonal replacement therapy for gender identification 
disorder, agreeing with the plaintiffs that to deprive them of this medical intervention would cause 
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legal and ethical questions arise that muddy the waters related to 
interactions between the prisoner, family, providers, and custodial agents.5 
For hospital providers, the initial concern is who consents for basic 
treatment and procedures.6 For example, what if the prisoner-patient 
becomes critically ill? The consent question becomes more complicated for 
the incapacitated or mentally ill prisoner-patient often leaving hospital staff 
to wonder: who decides the goals of care and treatment?7 Staff may be 
caught in the middle, trying to determine if the family, the warden, or the 
medical director of the custodial agency has ultimate authority over the 
final decision regarding the patient’s welfare.8 There are questions that 
must be addressed when looking at private hospitals. Are private hospitals 
considered state actors for constitutional liability purposes since most 
receive federal funding that supplies a large part of operating budgets?9 
Does a private hospital have a role in coordinating organ donation for a 
prisoner-patient?10 After a brief contextual review of prisoner 
epidemiology, this article will explore informed consent, organ donation, 
and sources of liability for both public and private entities, and suggest 
policy parameters to guide providers who may treat prisoners. 
 
“physical and emotional harm.” Brief for Am. Med. Ass’n, Mental Health America, et al., as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 10-2339 
& 10-2446).  
 5. Nancy Dubler, Ethical Dilemmas in Prisons and Jail Health Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG (Mar. 10, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/03/10/ethical-dilemmas-in-prison-and-
jail-health-care/ (outlining various ethical issues that arise for a hospitalized prisoner, including 
refusal/denial of care, the doctor-patient relationship, informed consent, and confidentiality). 
 6. Linda Fleisher et al., A Practical Guide to Informed Consent: What is Informed Consent?, 
TEMPLE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., http://www.templehealth.org/ICTOOLKIT/html/ictoolkitpage1.html 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
 7. E. Fuller Torrey et al., The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: 
A State Survey, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://tacreports.org/storage/documents/treatment-behind-bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf. 
 8. See generally Prisons and Prisoners’ Rights: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION  INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Sept. 15, 2015) (stating that the 
courts generally will defer to prison officials in making decisions about prisoners’ rights). 
 9. Sykes v. McPhillips, 412 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200–01 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating the instances 
where private hospitals are state actors for constitutional purposes: (1) when there is a nexus 
between the state and the provider, (2) when the provider acts under state compulsion, and (3) 
when the provision of care constitutes a public function). 
 10. Cf. Andrew M. Cameron et al., Should a Prisoner be Placed on the Organ Transplant 
Waiting List?, AMA J. ETHICS (Feb. 2008), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2008/02/ccas2-
0802.html (discussing ethical and legal considerations underlying the question of whether a 
prisoner should be placed on the organ transplant waiting list).  
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II.  GENERAL EPIDEMIOLOGY OF PRISONERS IN THE U.S. 
In essence, the total prison population has expanded significantly over 
the years,11 and with this expansion comes an understandably higher 
incidence of inmate disease requiring medical services.12 The various 
jurisdictions are at liberty to determine “how” to deliver care—whether 
through hired prison medical staff and contractors, or sending inmates to 
private hospitals for specialty or emergency services.13 Of interest to the 
private provider is the expectation of being asked to see and treat a larger 
number of prisoners than in prior years.14 Interestingly enough, though not 
explored in this article, telemedicine may also be a future way in which the 
private provider will be asked to consult on prisoner medical matters.15  
A.  General Numbers of Prisoners 
The National Prisoner Statistics (“NPS”) Program has operationalized 
the collection of annualized prisoner data through the U.S. Census Bureau 
since the early 20th Century,16 but participation in the survey is 
voluntary.17 State prisoner population totals, as of the end of 2013, far 
outpaced federal prisons in terms of the volume of inmates.18 Specifically, 
 
 11. See U.S. Prison Populations – Trends and Implications, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/1044.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (stating that the 
number of inmates in American prisons has exceeded two million for the first time). 
 12. See State Prison Health Care Spending, A REPORT FROM THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
AND THE JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUNDATION 1, 9 (July 2014), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2014/07/StatePrisonHealthCareSpendingReport.pdf 
(detailing statistics regarding the prevalence of disease and mental illness in prisons). 
 13.  See Beth Kutscher, Rumble Over Jailhouse Healthcare, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug. 
31, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130831/MAGAZINE/308319891. 
 14. See Douglas C. McDonald et al., Telemedicine Can Reduce Correctional Health Care 
Costs: An Evaluation of a Prison Telemedicine Network, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 14 (Mar. 1999), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/175040.pdf (showing almost 120 total telemedicine consultations 
per month in 1997 compared to 40 conventional in-prison consultations). 
 15. Id. at 29; Philip S. Schaenman et al., Opportunities for Cost Savings in Corrections 
Without Sacrificing Service Quality: Inmate Health Care, URBAN  INST. 7 (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412754-Inmate-Health-Care.pdf (describing how 
telemedicine is a way for doctors to speak to their patients remotely, and has the capacity to 
increase efficiency and reduce costs). 
 16. E. Ann Carson, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013 (2014) [hereinafter BJS Prisoners 2013]. This report by 
E. Ann Carlson, Ph.D., is a compilation of demographic statistics, including total numbers of 
inmates by prison jurisdiction, male/female comparisons, sentenced prisoners, imprisonment rate 
per 100,000, and admissions and releases of prisoners for 2012 and 2013. The report also includes 
jurisdictional volume data for prisoners held in the custody of private prisons inter alia as well as a 
state-by-state analysis, offense data, and military correctional data. 
 17. Id. at 28. 
 18. Id. at 2. 
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state prisons housed 1,358,875 inmates while federal prisons housed 
215,866 inmates for a total prison population of 1,574,741 in 2013.19 2013 
saw the first increase in prison population in three years by approximately 
4,300 inmates.20 Overall, the total number of prisoners in both federal and 
state facilities has risen approximately five-fold since 1978.21 The burden 
for assessing, treating, and caring for this large number of prisoners rests 
with state and federal governments.22 While there are several options for 
providing medical services to prisoners, more states are privatizing medical 
services through third party contractors.23 This article does not discuss the 
debate over whether privatization of medical services is better or worse for 
patient health care. Rather, this article is concerned with prisoner-patients 
who are taken outside of contracted services for medical care and addresses 
the different sources of liability for state actors and individual physicians. 
Often private hospitals are called upon as experts in specialty areas to 
treat prisoner-patients, including those in emergency situations.24 While the 
NPS collects information regarding the number of prisoners who are 
transported to private hospitals for treatment, states furnish this information 
on a voluntary basis.25 Thus, there is simply no way of knowing the actual 
volume of prisoner-patients in the private setting without an intense 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction survey utilizing cost analysis data or other 
coding source through state agencies.26 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1. 
 22. John Schmitt et al., The High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y 
RESEARCH 10 (June 2010),  http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-
06.pdf (stating that federal, state, and local governments combined spent almost $75 billion on 
corrections in 2008).   
 23. See, e.g., Innovative Correctional Healthcare, WEXFORD HEALTH, 
http://www.wexfordhealth.com/index.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2015). Wexford Health Sources, 
Inc. was incorporated in 1992 for the purpose of delivering medical services to correctional 
facilities. They serve over 97,000 inmates in 120 correctional institutions across the country. Id.   
 24. See Patients’ Rights, WEST’S ENCYC. OF AM. LAW, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Patients_Rights.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (discussing 
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, passed in order to prevent “patient 
dumping” by setting out the criteria for emergency services and the safe transfer of patients 
between hospitals); see also Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 
1985) (recognizing that a private health care organization may be liable under a tort theory when 
the organization “knew that [specialty] medical care was necessary but simply refused to provide 
it”). 
 25. BJS Prisoners 2013, supra note 16, at 28 (stating that the report’s effectiveness depends 
on state participation). 
 26. Id. (explaining jurisdictional issues and the distinction of “inmates in custody” vs. 
“prisoners under jurisdiction,” as well as non-reporting states that may further convolute the data 
the author is discussing in this article). 
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Even at the state level, available data is not easily acquired, and 
sometimes not collected at all.27 In Maryland, the Health Services Cost 
Review Commission (“HSCRC”) sets reimbursement rates for hospitals and 
collects data related to admissions and discharges.28 Of the hundreds of data 
points that are tabulated routinely by the HSCRC,29 none are granular 
enough to demonstrate what percentage of inmates in the state utilizes 
private resources.30 If the HSCRC is representative of available data on this 
topic, it is not immediately clear that prisoner use of private health systems 
is publicly reported.31 Recently published evidence suggests, however, that 
health care spending has increased related to the burgeoning prisoner 
population.32 According to a recent publication by the Pew Charitable 
Trusts entitled “Managing Prison Health Care,” a majority of states have 
seen a 28% increase in health care spending owing in part to an aging 
prison population with underlying diseases brought by them into the 
system.33 
The Maryland example, however, may provide some insight into the 
utilization. The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correction 
Services (“DPSCS”) collects basic information on costs and volume of 
prisoners who utilize inpatient care, outpatient specialty and surgical care, 
and emergency department resources.34 For fiscal year 2014 (FY14), 5,944 
prisoners were seen in private settings in those categories.35 In calendar 
year 2013 for Maryland, the total number of sentenced prisoners, state and 
federal, male and female, was 20,988.36 Though the data collection periods 
 
 27. Id. at 28–29 (discussing non-reporting states). 
 28. Hospital Patient Level Data Submission Requirements and Production Schedules, THE 
MARYLAND HEALTH SERVICES COST REVIEW COMM’N, 
http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/hsp_Data.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2015); Rate Setting Activities, THE 
MARYLAND HEALTH SERVICES COST REVIEW COMM’N, http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/aRates.cfm 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
 29. See generally Hospital Data and Reporting, THE MARYLAND HEALTH SERVICES COST 
REVIEW COMM’N, http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/hsp_Data.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Managing Prison Health Care Spending, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2014/05/15/managing-prison-health-
care-spending (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). The Pew Charitable Trust analysis of state-by-state 
prisoner health care spending showed a 28% median increase in per-inmate spending in 35 of 44 
states. Id. The explanation for the increase includes, “Aging inmate populations[,] [p]revalence of 
infectious and chronic diseases, mental illness, and substance abuse among inmates, many of 
whom enter prison with these problems.” Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Email sent from The Medical Director’s Office of DPSCS, to Jeffrey Natterman (Nov. 21, 
2014) (on file with author) (DPSCS contracts for utilization management). 
 35. Id. 
 36. BJS Prisoners 2013, supra note 16, at 5. 
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do not exactly correlate between the Maryland methods and the NPS 
systems, a general mathematical correlation suggests that approximately 28 
percent of prisoners were seen and treated at private facilities in Maryland 
during a twelve-month period.37  
B.  Morbidity and Mortality Data 
Comparisons of prisoner mortality rates between the state, federal, and 
local institutions cannot be performed with clarity due to the diverse 
demographics and health characteristics of each jurisdiction.38 However, in 
2012, while the mortality rate in federal prisons declined by 10 percent, 
there was no substantive change in the state prison mortality rate.39 
In comparing the reported causes of death for local jails and state 
prisons, the numbers in the following table represent the statistically 
significant rate for each category. Note, however, that the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons has not released cause of death information for analysis by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics.40  
TABLE 1: REPORTED CAUSES OF DEATH AT LOCAL JAILS 
 AND STATE PRISONS 
 AGE AT DEATH CAUSE OF DEATH SEX 
LOCAL JAIL 
 
51% were 45 
or older 
Suicide 
40/100,000 Males - 87%  
STATE 
PRISON 
 
55% were 45 
or older 
Cancer 
81/100,000 
Heart Disease 
63/100,000 
 
Males - 97% 
 
  
 
 37.  Grossly calculating the number of private Maryland visits “x,” or 5,944, divided by the 
NPS data for Maryland total prisoners by calendar year “y,” or 20,988, for an estimated value of 
28.3%. Infra notes 34–36. This number represents a significant portion of prisoner-patients in the 
private setting, but also is fluid because of the lack of data collection on this topic. Id. 
 38. See Margaret E. Noonan & Scott Ginder, Mortality in Local Jails and State Prisoners, 
2000-2012-Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 (Oct. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0012st.pdf 
[hereinafter BJS Mortality 2012]. 
 39. See id. at 3. According to the report, there was a total of 3,351 deaths in state prisons 
while local jails saw the first increase in death rates by 2% in 2009. Id. 
 40. Id. at 28. 
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Whether a prisoner receives direct, hands-on care, or care over the 
airwaves, a major deficit in analyzing and understanding prisoner health 
issues is the uncoordinated methodologies for obtaining and reporting data 
at many levels.41 Nonetheless, the legal benchmarks by which that care is 
consented to and delivered are complex but readily available and digestible 
for the private provider.42 
III. CONSENT FOR HOSPITALIZED PRISONER-PATIENTS  
AND THE PRISON’S INTERESTS 
A.  Medical Consent to Treat 
It is well-settled law that prisoners maintain constitutional protections 
while incarcerated.43 In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court declared 
“[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the 
protections of the Constitution.”44 It is also well-settled that such 
constitutional rights for prisoners are not absolute, and that great deference 
should be given to state actors in making and implementing policies that are 
aimed at maintaining the safety and security of the institution.45 Finding the 
balance between a prisoner’s constitutional rights while incarcerated and a 
state actor’s policy determinations can be a challenge, especially in the 
context of providing health care to prisoners.46 
In the watershed case Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court 
determined that the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides that 
 
 41. Schaenman et al., supra note 15, at 28.  
 42. See Prisons and Prisoners’ Rights: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION  INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
 45. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“We must accord substantial 
deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant 
responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the 
most appropriate means to accomplish them.”); see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
342, 349 (1987) (“To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have 
determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a 
‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of 
fundamental constitutional rights.”); Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (“Where a state penal system is 
involved, federal courts have, as we indicated in Martinez, additional reason to accord deference 
to the appropriate prison authorities.”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1973) (“where 
state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the 
appropriate prison authorities.”).  
 46. Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that if prison officials, 
including doctors, identify situations in which they reasonably believe that treatment is required, 
notwithstanding the prisoner’s asserted right to refuse it, the right must give way). 
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prisoners are entitled to adequate health care while incarcerated.47 The 
Court concluded that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners” meets the level of cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by 
the Eighth Amendment.48 A prisoner, by definition, is not free to seek 
treatment for serious medical conditions that may be life-threatening or 
extremely painful.49 Allowing a prisoner to suffer with a treatable medical 
condition that the prisoner cannot address on his own due to confinement 
imposed by the state could result in liability for the state under the Eighth 
Amendment.50 
The standard for determining “deliberate indifference,” and thus the 
fundamental constraints on state-provided health care in prison, was 
established in Farmer v. Brennan.51 There, the Supreme Court held that in 
order for an official to be found liable for cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment for denying health care, the health care 
official must both be aware of an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or 
safety and must disregard such risk.52 “The Eighth Amendment does not 
outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual 
‘punishments.’ ”53 The showing of deliberate indifference must be 
subjective and based on the intent of the actor.54  
While a prisoner’s right to receive health care is embedded within the 
United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment,55 a prisoner’s right to 
consent to or refuse such health care is mostly embedded in the common-
law right to informed consent and an individual’s constitutional right to 
privacy.56 Generally, courts have permitted prisoners to exercise this right 
 
 47. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) (holding that “deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ 
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”). 
 48. Id. at 104.  
 49. ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, 102–03 (3d ed. 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/treat
ment_of_prisoners_commentary_website.pdf.  
 50. Brittany Bondurant, The Privatization of Prisons and Prisoner Healthcare: Addressing 
the Extent of Prisoners’ Right to Healthcare, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
407, 408–09 (2013). See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50–51 (1988) (holding that there was 
state action where a private physician had contracted with the state to provide medical care for 
prisoners). 
 51. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. (stating that the official must be aware of facts from which he or she could infer a 
substantial risk of serious harm, and he or she must also draw the inference). 
 55. Id. at 832. 
 56. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) (“After Quinlan, however, 
most courts have based a right to refuse treatment either solely on the common-law right to 
informed consent or on both the common-law right and a constitutional privacy right.”). 
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to consent to treatment or refuse to receive treatment in the same way any 
patient outside of the prison system would be permitted to do so.57 The 
exception to such standard is when the state’s interest outweighs the liberty 
interest of the patient in making his or her medical decisions.58 As stated 
above, prisoners continue to enjoy the protections of the Constitution even 
while incarcerated, but the Court has determined that many of the 
protections afforded to other citizens do not extend, in full, to prisoners.59 
As the Court in Washington v. Harper stated, “the extent of a prisoner’s 
right under the [Constitution] to avoid the unwanted [treatment] must be 
defined in the context of the inmate’s confinement.”60 
The Supreme Court set the standard in Turner by which a court should 
determine whether a state action unconstitutionally impinges on an inmate’s 
constitutional right, such as a prisoner’s right to privacy in making his or 
her own health care decision that may conflict with the prison’s interest.61 
The standard is whether the action is “reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological interest.”62 The Court articulated the standard largely on the 
principle of separation of powers by noting, “[s]ubjecting the day-to-day 
judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would 
seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt 
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.”63 
The Court further noted that “[T]he rule would also distort the decision-
making process, for every administrative judgment would be subject to the 
 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 278 (“Just this Term, in the course of holding that a State’s procedures for 
administering antipsychotic medication to prisoners were sufficient to satisfy due process 
concerns, we recognized that prisoners possess ‘a significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.’ ”) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990)); Harper, 494 U.S. 
at 229 (“The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a 
substantial interference with that person’s liberty”); Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 
2006);White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A prisoner’s right to refuse 
treatment is useless without knowledge of the proposed treatment. Prisoners have a right to such 
information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed 
treatment, as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments that can be made 
available in a prison setting.”); Leaphart v. Prison Health Servs., No. 3:10-CV-1019, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 135435 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 21, 2010) (holding that convicted prisoners retain a limited 
right to refuse treatment and a related right to be informed of the proposed treatment and viable 
alternatives).  
 58. See Prisons and Prisoners’ Rights: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION  INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (stating that the 
rational basis test is used to review prison regulations). 
 59. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (noting that freedom of association is 
curtailed in the prison context). 
 60. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222. 
 61. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 89 (1987). 
 62. Id. at 89. 
 63. Id.  
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possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less 
restrictive way of solving the problem at hand.”64 
The Court in Turner set forth four factors that should be taken into 
consideration when determining whether a state action by prisons meets the 
rational basis test: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” 
between the state action and a legitimate government interest, (2) whether 
alternative means exist for those impacted to exercise the asserted 
constitutional right, (3) whether and to what extent accommodating the 
asserted right will impact prison staff, the inmates’ liberty, and the 
distribution of resources, and (4) whether alternatives exist that are less 
restrictive and still achieve the asserted interests of the state.65 
Great deference is afforded to prison officials in determining what is 
necessary for the security and safety of the prison and the other prisoners,66 
and “it is the rare case in which a court finds that the State’s intrusion into 
the constitutional rights of a presumptively innocent criminal defendant 
warrants a judicial intrusion into ‘the determinations of those charged with 
the formidable task of running a prison.’ ”67 
The Supreme Court elaborated upon its decision in Turner when 
holding, in Harper, that a prison official’s ability to override a patient’s 
health care decision-making stands even if the patient is incompetent.68 In 
applying the standard articulated in Turner, the Supreme Court concluded 
that a prison’s action to medicate an incompetent, violent prisoner who 
represents a danger to prison officials and others within the prison walls 
was “reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,”69 and that 
such a rational basis standard should be applied even if the constitutional 
right being infringed is fundamental.70 The fact that the prisoner was 
incompetent did not change the Court’s analysis.71 Courts applying Turner 
have concluded that there are many other scenarios in which the state’s 
interest is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, thus 
validating infringement on a prisoner’s constitutional right to privacy and, 
by extension, a prisoner’s right to consent to or refuse medical treatment the 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 89–91. 
 66. Id. at 85. 
 67. Jason Feldman, Piercing the Veil of Dangerousness in Forcible Medication: Why Pretrial 
Detainees Are Due More Process Than Washington v. Harper, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 467, 491 
(2013) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987)). 
 68. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222–23 (1990). 
 69. Id. at 225–26. 
 70. Id.at 223. 
 71. Id. at 222. 
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prison officials believe is in the prison’s best interest.72 For example, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1979 held that a prisoner could 
be forced to undergo dialysis because the prisoner’s refusal to undergo 
dialysis was not related to his wish to die, but rather was an act of protest in 
an attempt to secure a transfer to a minimum security prison.73 The court 
determined that it would be too disruptive to the prison system to have 
patients refuse medical treatment in an attempt to manipulate prison 
officials and held that that state’s interest in maintaining the order of the 
prison overrode the prisoner’s constitutional right of privacy and choice of 
health care.74 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York reached the 
same conclusion in Zaire v. Dalsheim, where a prisoner was required to 
receive the diphtheria-tetanus vaccine or face solitary confinement.75 The 
court concluded that the state’s interest in “preventing the spread of deadly 
diseases among a closely quartered prison population”76 overrode any 
interest an individual prisoner may have in refusing the inoculation, since it 
was reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective.77 
B.  Constitutional Rights of Incompetent or Incapacitated Prisoners 
It appears relatively settled law that a competent prisoner has the right 
to consent to or refuse to receive medical treatment, and that a prison 
official may either override such a decision or force treatment on the 
prisoner provided there is a legitimate penological interest being served.78 
However, the jurisprudence fails to address who stands in the shoes of the 
patient in making medical decisions when the patient is incapacitated or 
incompetent and there is no legitimate danger or fear with which the prison 
 
 72. Comm’n of Corr. v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 458 (Mass. 1979); Zaire v. Dalsheim, 698 F. 
Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 73. Myers, 399 N.E.2d at 458. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Zaire, 698 F. Supp. at 58, 60–61. 
 76. Id. at 60.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Prisons and Prisoner’s Rights: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION  INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). See also Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (stating that “when a prisoner regulation impinges on inmates’ 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests”). 
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officials are concerned.79 The answer to such question often lies within 
individual state statutes.80  
Almost all states have a mechanism that permits individuals to 
designate a health care agent who is responsible for making medical 
decisions for the individual in the event the individual becomes 
incapacitated or incompetent.81 States also promulgate laws that establish a 
“default” hierarchy of decision-makers in the event the patient has not 
properly identified who he or she wants to be the decision maker.82 Most 
states do not directly address the issue of the prisoner-patient. Absent 
statutory instructions to the contrary, hospitals should rely upon the state 
sanctioned hierarchy of decision makers when faced with a prisoner who is 
incapacitated or incompetent.83 
While one could argue that prisoners are wards of the state, and 
therefore, it is the state that should make health care decisions on behalf of 
the incapacitated or incompetent patient, the interest of the patient rarely 
aligns with the interest of the prison.84 Absent a legitimate state interest to 
the contrary, prison officials should be removed from the medical decision-
making process, as the patient’s surrogate would likely best represent the 
patient’s interests.85 To select a surrogate, the typical statutory hierarchy 
should be followed, as the hierarchy reflects those in the best position to 
carry out the patient’s wishes.86 
The State of Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services (“DPSCS”) developed a policy that directly addresses medical 
decision making for incompetent inmates and has implemented a process 
 
 79. See generally Women’s Health & Education Center, End of Life Decision Making, 
http://www.womenshealthsection.com/content/print.php3?title=heal022&cat=5&lng=english (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 80. Id. See also ABA, Default Surrogate Consent Statutes (June 2014), 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2014_default_surrogate_consen
t_statutes.authcheckdam.pdf (providing an overview of state default surrogate consent statutes in 
the absence of an appointed agent or guardian with health powers). 
 81. Id. 
 82. ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice: Treatment of Prisoners, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_tre
atmentprisoners.html#23-1.1 (2011). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See M. Scott Smith et al., Healthcare Decision-Making for Mentally Incapacitated 
Incarcerated Individuals, 22 ELDER L.J. 175, 197–98 (2014). 
 85. Id. at 198 (noting that the patient’s surrogate is often in the best position to make the 
decisions in the patient’s best interests). 
 86. Id. See also ABA, Standards on Treatment of Prisoners, § 23-6.14, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_tre
atmentprisoners.html#23-6.14.  
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requiring judicial review.87 Policy #124-403 states: “it is the policy of 
DPSCS to allow inmates to accept or refuse medical/mental health 
treatment up to the degree of their competency.”88 Further, “[f]or 
individuals determined to be incompetent, however, guardianship in some 
form may have to be secured.”89 The policy proscribes that once evaluated 
and deemed incompetent by a psychiatrist assigned by the private medical 
provider contracted to provide services at the institution where the inmate is 
housed, guardianship should be pursued for the inmate.90 
In Maryland, guardianship proceedings require a conclusion from a 
court of competent jurisdiction that there is 
clear and convincing evidence that a person lacks sufficient 
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible 
decisions concerning his person, including provisions for health 
care . . . because of any mental disability [or] disease . . . and that 
no less restrictive form of intervention is available which is 
consistent with the person’s welfare and safety.91 
The guardianship proceeding inherently involves appointing an 
independent third party who is most likely to adhere to the standard of 
substituted judgment, and choose the course of action most similar to the 
patient had the patient not been incapacitated.92 Interestingly, for the 
Maryland general population, the law does not require a psychiatrist or 
psychologist to determine incapacity, but only requires two licensed 
physicians.93 The Maryland DPSCS has clearly prescribed an added layer 
of protection for the potentially incapacitated prisoner needing health 
care.94 A surrogate structure such as this could serve as a model policy in 
most jurisdictions to ensure the prisoner-patient’s best interest is 
represented in complicated medical decision-making scenarios. While such 
 
 87. STATE OF MD. DEP’T. OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., Petition for Guardianship, 
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicservs/procurement/ihs/directives/DOC/124_403.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-705(b) (LexisNexis 2014). 
 92. Id. 
 93. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (“Prior to providing, 
withholding, or withdrawing treatment for which authorization has been obtained or will be 
sought under this subtitle, the attending physician and a second physician, one of whom shall have 
examined the patient within 2 hours before making the certification, shall certify in writing that 
the patient is incapable of making an informed decision regarding the treatment.”). 
 94. MD. PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., Petition for Guardianship, DPSCSD 124-403, 
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/ publicservs/procurement/ihs/directives/DOC/124_403.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
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a policy is likely in the patient’s best interest,95 absent clear legal guidance 
or local policy, the liability risks hospitals face in permitting such surrogate 
decision making remain unclear. 
C.  Prisoners and Organ Donation 
Issues abound when considering prisoner organ donation.96 These 
range from the ethical concerns about whether a prisoner should receive 
valuable organ resources over the general population to whether death row 
inmates should be allowed to donate their organs upon successful 
executions.97 The opinions are both varied and persuasive depending on 
your core ethical and medico-legal beliefs.98 This paper does not explore 
the heated ethical debates regarding prisoners and organ transplant. Instead, 
it focuses on providing guidance on the operational aspects of prisoner 
organ donation for private hospitals. 
The Organ Procurement and Transplant Network (“OTPN”) was 
established by Congress thirty years ago to proscribe the selling of organs, 
and to coordinate and control this scarce resource allocation.99 OPTN has 
established clear policies with regard to every facet of the organ donation 
process.100 However, Organ Procurement Organizations (“OPO”) are free 
to set their own criteria for accepting organs and the prisoner population 
may be excluded from consideration under these policies.101 The OPTN 
policies establish the responsibility for determining organ compatibility and 
 
 95. End of Life Decision Making, WOMEN’S HEALTH & EDUCATION CTR., 
http://www.womenshealthsection.com/content/print.php3?title=heal022&cat=5&lng=english (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 96. See, e.g., Should Prisoners be Allowed to Donate their Organs?, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/ 2013/04/25/should-prisoners-be-allowed-to-donate-their-
organs (last updated Apr. 26, 2013). 
 97. Whitney Hinkle, Giving Until it Hurts: Prisoners are not the Answer to the National 
Organ Shortage, 35 IND. L. REV. 593, 596–97, 601–02 (2002); Kate Douglas, Prison Inmates are 
Constitutionally Entitled to Organ Transplants – So Now What?, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539, 561–
62 (2005); Arkalgud Sampath Kumar, Prisoners on Death Row, 95 ANN THORAC 770, 770 
(2013), http://www.annalsthoracicsurgery.org/issue/S0003-4975%2812%29X0013-4?page=1; 
M.A. Millis & M. Simmerling; Prisoners as Organ Donors: Is it Worth the Effort? Is it Ethical?, 
41 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1, 23–24 (2009); OPTN/UNOS Ethics Comm., The Ethics of Organ 
Donation from Condemned Prisoners, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/the-ethics-
of-organ-donation-from-condemned-prisoners/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 98. See Hinkle, supra note 97; see also Kumar, supra note 97.  
 99. NATIONAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT OF 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006); Blood Vessels 
Recovered with Organs and Intended for use in Organ Transplantation, 71 Fed. Reg. 27649 
(proposed May 12, 2006) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121).  
 100. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Policies, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS. (last visited Oct. 1, 2015), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments 
/OPTN_Policies.pdf [hereinafter OPTN Policies]. 
 101. Id. 
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candidacy on OPO.102 However, what is clear from the point of view of the 
Ethics Committee of the OPTN/United Organ Sharing Network (“UNOS”) 
is that prisoners should not be excluded from lists of those seeking organs 
simply because they are incarcerated.103 Specifically, “[t]he UNOS Ethics 
Committee opines that absent any societal imperative, one’s status as a 
prisoner should not preclude them from consideration for a transplant; such 
consideration does not guarantee transplantation.”104 
Essentially, a prisoner is ethically entitled to receive a transplanted 
organ like anyone else on a transplant list and will be required to meet the 
strict criteria established to be a successful candidate.105 Once the medical 
provider for the correctional facility has identified a prisoner as needing an 
organ transplant, the prisoner would be referred to a transplant center for 
medical work up and a determination of candidacy.106 The transplant center 
then would follow its own specific policies regarding prisoner 
categorization and candidacy.107 
There is some recent evidence that facilitating prisoners’ access to 
organ transplants would actually reduce penological costs.108 In a study 
conducted evaluating 104 incarcerated end-stage renal disease (“ESRD”) 
patients, nine patients with a history of Hepatitis C were transplanted faster 
with Hepatitis C kidneys than other prisoners waiting for non-infectious 
organs (6.6 months versus 49.6 months).109 Study investigators concluded 
that overall costs for managing post-transplant patients were substantially 
lower than costs for continuing dialysis for those still waiting for 
kidneys.110 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Convicted Criminals and Transplant 
Evaluation, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last visited Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/convicted-criminals-and-transplant-evaluation/. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, The Ethics of Organ Donation from Condemned 
Prisoners, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last visited Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/the-ethics-of-organ-donation-from-condemned-
prisoners/ (stating, however, that the “OPTN/UNOS Ethics committee opposes any strategy or 
proposed statute regarding organ donation from condemned prisoners until all of the potential 
ethical concerns have been satisfactorily addressed.”); see also United Network for Organ 
Sharing, What Every Patient Needs to Know (last visited Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://www.unos.org/docs/WEPNTK.pdf (explaining the purpose of the United Network for 
Organ Sharing and its mission of availability for all types of patients).  
 106. Id. at 7. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Mandip Panesar et al., Evaluation of a Renal Transplant Program for Incarcerated 
ESRD Patients, 20 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 220, 226 (2014) (addressing the significant 
benefits of allowing prisoners’ access to transplants as opposed to dialysis). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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Private transplant centers engage in debates that focus more on their 
business model and institutional guidelines rather than constitutional or 
ethical concerns.111 These centers are pressed to discern available organs in 
constant demand,112 and to pass national certification muster with regard to 
survival rates, among other criteria.113 Prisoners who come to the hospital 
with a higher morbidity rate than the general population are not routinely 
considered the best candidates to either donate or to receive organs. 
Succinctly, in the absence of federal guiding documents or laws on 
prisoner organ donation, such policies and procedures are established state 
by state.114 As an example, Maryland’s Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services articulates the necessary procedures for those 
prisoners seeking transplantation, either to receive or donate.115 In 
Maryland, prisoners may donate organs to a family member in state, but the 
policy does not allow them to receive a solid organ.116 The donation 
process is overseen by the prison system’s regional medical director, but is 
clinically managed by the transplant center.117 The recipient bears the cost 
of the transplant.118 
For prisoner-patients who are incapacitated and are admitted to private 
hospitals with a fatal prognosis, the question may arise as to whom would 
consent for an organ donation.119 As discussed above, the consent process 
would typically follow the state statutes and regulations for surrogate 
decision making.120 The correctional facility could release the prisoner-
patient from incarceration as their continued custody requirement cannot be 
accomplished for punishment or rehabilitation owing to their fatal 
condition. At that point, the prisoner-patient simply would become like any 
 
 111. Hinkle, supra note 98.  
 112. Id. at 593–94. 
 113. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADVISORY COMM. ON ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION (2011) (noting regulations that encourage an increased rate of organ 
transplants from all types of donors and stringent transplant requirements in order to meet 
certification standards).  
 114. Prisoner Organ Transplants, Donations Create Controversy, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 
15, 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/apr/15/prisoner-organ-transplants-
donations-create-controversy/ (highlighting numerous states and their various approaches 
regarding prisoner organ donation). 
 115. MD. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY AND CORR. SERV. OFFICE OF CLINICAL SERV. AND INMATE 
HEALTH, ADMINISTRATIVE MANUAL, CH. 12, ORGAN DONORS AND TRANSPLANTS. 
 116. Id. at 1. 
 117. Id. at 2–3. 
 118. Id. 
 119. The Ethics of Organ Donation from Condemned Prisoners, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. – HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/the-
ethics-of-organ-donation-from-condemned-prisoners/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 120. Lisa V. Brock & Anna Mastroianni, Clinical Ethics and Law, UNIV. OF WASH. SCH. OF 
MED. (Jan. 22, 2013), https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/law.html#Surrogate. 
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other patient in the general population, and corresponding policies would 
apply. 
IV.  PRIVATE HOSPITAL LIABILITY 
In the context of receiving health care, prisoners may seek relief for 
alleged damages through various avenues against both the state and private 
actors.121 They may pursue an action based on Constitutional or federal 
statutory grounds, potentially reaching the state through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.122 They may also seek relief against individual physicians by 
filing malpractice claims based on state guidelines.123 For private hospitals, 
as articulated below, liability exposure exists, but a successful claim is 
generally atypical.124 Notably, a successful constitutionally based claim 
may have a greater impact on a larger number of people as a result of 
changes to the law affecting all prisoners.125 Private claims based on 
medical malpractice, while potentially financially rewarding for the 
individual, would have an insignificant impact, if any, on changing 
precedent.126  
A.  Constitutional and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 
The Constitution proscribes violations of prisoners’ rights by the 
federal government through various amendments including, but not limited 
to, the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” proscription, 
and by the state government through the Fourteenth Amendment.127 The 
general statutory remedy for prisoners who allege violations while in 
custody is established in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.128 In order for a claim to 
 
 121. Civil Liability for Inadequate Prisoner Medical Care, AELE MONTHLY L.J. 301, 302–03, 
307 (2007), http://www.aele.org/law/2007JBSEP/2007-09MLJ301.pdf. 
 122.  Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990). 
 123. Civil Liability for Inadequate Prisoner Medical Care, AELE MONTHLY L.J. 301, 302–03, 
307 (2007), http://www.aele.org/law/2007JBSEP/2007-09MLJ301.pdf. 
 124. Id. at 301–03. 
 125. Id. at 301–02. 
 126. Id. at 301–10 (noting various cases that demonstrate the difficulty in convincing a court of 
both the severity of the situation and intentional disregard for the prisoner’s health). 
 127. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, and citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
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successfully move forward pursuant to the constitutional and statutory 
framework, the injured party must show that the defendant is a state actor, 
or that they have committed acts under color of state law.129 The Supreme 
Court held firm to prior decisions stating that “state action” remedies and 
those “under color of state law” in essence are one and the same in general, 
though the merits giving rise to, and support of, a justiciable claim may 
vary from case to case.130 Either the state acts by abridging rights, or a 
private person acts under the ambit of state authority who then becomes 
potentially liable.131 The question that remains is whether a private hospital 
becomes a state actor based solely on the fact that it treats prisoners within 
its facility.  
The Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., articulated a 
two part approach to identify when conduct would be “fairly attributable” to 
the state: 
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some 
right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct 
imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is 
responsible . . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation 
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This 
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted 
together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, 
or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. 
Without a limit such as this, private parties could face 
constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state 
rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding 
them.132  
Clearly, the Court intended to limit private parties from being exposed 
to liability on state action grounds except where there is a clear nexus 
between the state and the private person.133 Because the facts of each case 
may be distinct with regard to when a private party acts under color of state 
law, the Court has articulated over the years several tests to ascertain the 
 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . .”). 
 129. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982). The complainant filed a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging due process violations by defendant when his property was attached 
pursuant to state law, thereby making a § 1983 remedy available. Id. at 925. The Court in Lugar 
explained the distinctions between a Fourteenth Amendment claim asserting “state action” versus 
a § 1983 claim asserting that a private individual acted under “color of state law.” Id. at 934. 
 130. Id. at 935 ( “If the challenged conduct of respondents constitutes state action as delimited 
by our prior decisions, then that conduct was also action under color of state law and will support 
a suit under § 1983.”). 
 131. Id. at 935–37. 
 132. Id. at 937 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. 
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connection between the private party and the state.134 Discerning the nexus 
that gives rise to liability then becomes heavily fact-based.135 
Are private hospitals and providers state actors? As described below, 
the courts have not been clear as to whether liability attaches, and that 
determination is fact-dependent. As far back as 1968, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial 
Hospital Commission, held that the defendant physicians sitting on a county 
appointed commission were liable under color of state law.136 The court 
stated: 
Defendant commission members were appointed by the 
governing body of Allen County to operate the hospital. 
Moreover, the hospital is the only one in the area and was 
financed in part by public funds. An institution such as this, 
serving an important public function and financed by public 
funds, is sufficiently linked with the state for its acts to be subject 
to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the 
members of the commission hold office as a result of 
governmental appointment and because they administer a public 
facility, their actions must be regarded as having been taken 
under color of law. Hence, the provisions of § 1983 and 
§ 1985(3) are applicable to them.137 
Simply put, the physicians sitting as commissioners with approval 
power over other physicians’ employment were so connected by way of 
appointment, funding, and function that they were acting on behalf of the 
municipality, thereby making them liable under color of state law.138 They 
 
 134. Id. at 939 (noting Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S 461, 469–70 (the “public function” test); 
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170–71 (the “state compulsion” test); Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (the “nexus” test); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149, 164 (the “joint action” test)).   
 135. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (involving a 
claim of racial discrimination by a coffee shop in a building owned by Parking Authority in which 
the court stated, “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious 
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance”); Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (involving plaintiff’s allegation of state action 
when private company cut off power without due process, the Court stated in dicta, “[t]he mere 
fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the 
State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citation omitted). 
 136. 397 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1968). 
 137. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006) (“[I]f two or more persons in any State or 
Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under 
the laws . . . whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and 
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived 
may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against 
any one or more of the conspirators.”). 
 138. Meredith, 397 F.2d at 35. 
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were not state officials per se, but they acted as such, conspiring with state 
officials to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights. 139 
Likewise, in O’Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hospital, the 
Sixth Circuit also found a sufficient nexus between the defendant hospital’s 
Board of Directors and the state to overturn the District Court’s dismissal 
below.140 Unlike Meredith, the Board of Directors for Grayson County War 
Memorial Hospital was not appointed by the state.141 The O’Neill court 
found a nexus on other grounds because of other connections the hospital 
had with the state, including lease arrangements and hospital revenue 
through statutory-based allocation of funds.142 Interestingly, the O’Neill 
court did not clearly define the test upon which it relied to determine the 
nexus between private and state action.143 Judicial history is replete with 
attempts at creating a nexus test without uniformity or universal adoption. 
Closer to the point of private actors and prisoners, the Supreme Court 
in West v. Adkins explored a case involving a North Carolina inmate.144 
After tearing his Achilles tendon, he was assessed and treated by a 
contractual orthopedic physician.145 The prisoner brought the § 1983 claim 
pro se, alleging the physician failed to adequately treat (or make a referral 
for) his condition through surgery.146 The District Court found that the 
physician was acting under color of state law, and was therefore liable for 
damages caused by the treatment delay.147 After the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision, an en banc 
panel reheard the case and ultimately affirmed the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.148 The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.149 
According to the Supreme Court, the split Court of Appeals erroneously 
 
 139. Id. at 35–36. 
 140. O’Neill v. Grayson Cnty. War Mem’l Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140, 1142 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(physician plaintiff claimed his due process and equal protection rights were violated by the 
Board’s refusal to allow him to admit patients to the hospital). 
 141. Id. at 1143. 
 142. Id. at 1142–43. 
 143. Id. The O’Neill Court stated, “We do not suggest that the presence of state action in this 
case or in any case can be determined by the application of some clear-cut test. Id. at 1143. See 
also id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (“[T]o fashion 
and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection 
Clause is an ‘impossible task’ which ‘[t]his Court has never attempted’ . . . . Only by sifting facts 
and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be 
attributed its true significance.”) (citation omitted).  
 144. West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 44 (1988). 
 145. Id. at 43–44. 
 146. Id. at 44–45. 
 147. Id. at 45–46. 
 148. Id. at 46. 
 149. Id. at 57–58. 
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applied a prior Supreme Court decision involving an accused public 
defender who was found not to be acting under color of state law, and 
therefore not liable in a § 1983 claim.150 
In West, the respondent physician was employed under contract in 
order to render required medical services to inmates.151 Because his duties 
were aligned with the state’s objectives, the Court held that the physician 
was acting under color of state law.152 The nexus was as close as it could 
get.153 The state prison system had a duty to render appropriate medical 
care,154 and the contract physician likewise had the same affirmative 
duty;155 they were inextricably intertwined as actors with the same purpose 
of treating the prisoner-patient.156 
The Court also expressed concern that if private physicians under 
contract with the state are to provide medical care, they could escape 
liability under the pretense that they were not state actors.157 Thus the state 
would be able to absolve itself of its constitutional duty to provide adequate 
medical treatment by contracting such services to a private third party.158 
With finality, the Court held that a successful petitioner must demonstrate 
two things. The first element required a showing that the petitioner was 
deprived a right afforded by the Constitution, or a United States law.159 The 
second element required a showing that the offender was acting under color 
of law.160 In this case, the physician’s action satisfied both elements.161 
At the same time, there are a host of cases where courts found no state 
action against a private hospital.162 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
 
 150. West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50–51 (1988). In Polk County v. Dodson, the Court held that 
a public defender acting in his professional capacity was doing so in controversion of the state’s 
goals in prosecuting the inmate, and therefore, was not acting under color of state law. 454 U.S. 
312, 325 (1981) (opposing purposes widens the gap when determining whether or not a private 
actor is operating under color of state law).   
 151. West, 487 U.S. at 45. 
 152. Id. at 54–55 (stating “[i]t is only those physicians authorized by the State to whom the 
inmate may turn. Under state law, the only medical care West could receive for his injury was that 
provided by the State”). 
 153. See id. at 55 (stating that North Carolina employs physicians and defers to their 
professional judgment in providing medical care to its prison inmates). 
 154. Id. at 56. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. West, 487 U.S. at 55–56. 
 158. Id. at 56 n.14 (quoting West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 998 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
 159. Id. at 48. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 48, 54.  
 162. See, e.g., Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 520 F.2d 894, 895–96 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that 
“for a state involvement with a private entity to confer jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the 
involvement must be with the specific activity of which a party complains”) (citation omitted); 
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Circuit held that simply because a hospital receives federal funds, the 
decision not to renew a provider’s privileges does not rise to the level of 
state action.163 In Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, a Catholic Church 
affiliated hospital refused a provider’s renewal of privileges because he 
performed sterilizations and abortions against hospital bylaws.164 The 
district court held there was no state action, and therefore, no relief under 
§ 1983; however, they did find that the hospital was in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 300a-7.165 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
“concluding that the receipt of federal funds alone does not transform an 
otherwise private activity into a state action.”166 
That same month, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit tackled a 
similar issue in Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital.167 In Taylor, the hospital 
received state tax exemptions and Hill-Burton Funds168 and denied the 
petitioner’s request for a tubal ligation following her Caesarian section.169 
After the hospital refused her procedure, the patient subsequently joined a 
class that claimed, inter alia, that the hospital acted under color of state law 
to deny them the procedure and relief was therefore available pursuant to § 
1983.170 The petitioner argued that her case was distinct from Chrisman 
and previous cases because the hospital had a monopoly in Billings, 
Montana, and there was no other place the petitioner could have gone for 
her sterilization procedure.171 The question, then, was whether the 
 
Tomarkin v. Ward, 534 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that a former state prisoner 
could not recover against a hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the hospital was deliberately 
indifferent to the medical needs of the prisoner); Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d. 861, 863 (S.D. N.Y 
1984) (finding that the professional actions of a private physician does not establish that the 
physician “act under the color of state law when providing medical services to an inmate”) 
(citation omitted). 
 163. Id. at 896. 
 164. Id. at 895. 
 165. Id. at 895–96. In Watkins, the hospital received Hill-Burton Funds. Id. at 896.   
 166. Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 520 F.2d 894, 896 (1975) (quoting Ascherman v. 
Presbyterian Hosp. of Pacific Med. Ctr., 507 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1974)) (“The mere receipt 
of Hill-Burton funds . . . is not sufficient [sic] connection between the state and the private activity 
of which appellant complains to make out state action.”). 
 167. 523 F.2d 75 (D. Mont. 1975). 
 168. Id. at 75–76. 
 169. Id. at 76.  
 170. Id.  
 171. See id. at 77 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 360 (1974)) 
(“[P]rivate conduct may not be regarded as that of the state unless the state is involved in the 
specific activity complained of, and that the monopoly status of a private . . . company did not in 
itself or in combination with state regulation and the fact that an essential public service was 
involved, constitute ‘state action.’ ”) (emphasis added). 
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monopoly status of the private hospital alone or combined with government 
funding established state action.172  
However, seven years later, the Taylor court quoted the Supreme 
Court in Jackson when it stated in dicta that “there is ‘insufficient 
relationship between the challenged actions of the entity involved and their 
monopoly status.’ ”173 Ultimately, the court upheld the lower court’s ruling 
that no state action existed, and therefore, no relief could be granted for a 
§ 1983 claim.174 A monopoly simply is not enough to find that a private 
hospital was a state actor, or operated under color of state law.175 
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in West to hold that a private 
hospital that provided emergency care to a prisoner could not be considered 
a state actor.176 In Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, the court 
concluded that while the Supreme Court emphasized in West that the 
contractual relationship between the state and the provider was not 
dispositive of the state actor analysis,177 it comes into play when: 
[D]etermining whether a private health care provider has entered 
into its relationship with the state and the prisoner on a voluntary 
basis . . . private organizations and their employees that have 
only an incidental and transitory relationship with the state’s 
penal system usually cannot be said to have accepted, voluntarily, 
the responsibility of acting for the state and assuming the state’s 
responsibility for incarcerated persons.178  
While the conclusion in Rodriguez that the private hospital was not a 
state actor was based largely on its obligation under the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”) to treat any and all patients 
who needed emergency services regardless of their custodial status,179 the 
holding could be applied in the context of any private hospital providing 
basic medical care to a prisoner while under no specific contract with the 
state to provide such care.180 This analysis would be particularly true where 
 
 172. Id. at 77 (discussing whether the monopoly status of a hospital or receipt of government 
funds, among other things, suggests state action). Interestingly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, as discussed earlier in the section, relied on the monopoly of the hospital to infer 
state action. Meredith v. Allen Cnty. War Mem’l Hosp. Comm’n, 387 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1968).   
 173.   Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. Id. at 827–28. 
 180.  See id. at 828 (stating that the fact that a hospital has to provide emergency medical care 
to prisoners does not mean that it assumed the penological mission of the state). 
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a private hospital and its providers would be exercising independent 
professional judgment and not carrying out some state objective.181  
Any analysis of whether a private hospital would be considered a state 
actor for purposes of liability under a § 1983 claim is fact-intensive.182 
Recent case law indicates that it is unlikely a private hospital with no 
existing formal relationship with a prison would be considered a state 
actor.183  Private hospitals do not discriminate against the types of patients 
seen in its facility, and they are required to exercise independent 
professional medical judgment regardless of the status of the patient.184 
Private facilities may choose to contract with prison systems to render 
medical care on an as-needed basis.185 However, case law supports the 
conclusion that a private hospital incidentally assisting the state by treating 
prisoner-patients on an ad hoc basis would not qualify the hospital as 
voluntarily assuming the responsibility of the state.186 
Tangential to the prisoner analysis, but of great import, private 
hospitals now developing programs at the behest of the federal or state 
government may find they operate under color of state law, and therefore, 
may be exposed to liability under a § 1983 claim.187 The analysis may turn 
on whether the hospital or facility goes beyond activities conducted in the 
regular course of its business at the state’s behest.188 Liability may arise as 
the hospital acts less like an independent medical entity and more like a 
service provider working on behalf of the state. At the very least, the 
question may be reasonably put forth for this activity, or any similar activity 
 
 181. Id.  
 182. See Carmack v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 465 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(describing the analysis of a § 1983 claim in the case of a former train conductor alleging that the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority was a state actor: “[t]he inquiry, under any of these 
theories, is necessarily fact-intensive, and the ultimate conclusion regarding state action must be 
based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case”).  
 183. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(distinguishing hospitals that treat inmates in an emergency situation from those that contract with 
prison systems for voluntary care and concluding that the former action is not sufficient to make 
the hospital a state actor). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 827. 
 186. See id. (observing that private facilities that only have “incidental and transitory” 
interactions with the penal system have not assumed the state’s responsibility). 
 187. See JARED P. COLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43829, EBOLA: SELECTED 
LEGAL ISSUES (2014) (discussing programs for Ebola management, such as the required use 
of personal protective equipment for hospital workers, that would be mandated under the 
authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration). 
 188. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that a § 1983 claim in the healthcare setting must weigh the extent to which the doctor’s actions 
were controlled or influenced by the state). 
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where the government intervenes for the purpose of public safety by 
utilizing private resources.189 
B.  Vicarious Liability 
Ironically, even if it was determined that a private hospital was 
standing in the shoes of the state when providing medical care to a prisoner, 
the Supreme Court has explicitly held that vicarious liability cannot be 
imposed on a municipality under § 1983, as Congress did not intend § 1983 
to create liability on states solely because it employs a tortfeasor.190 
Liability for the state under § 1983 exists only if the municipality itself has 
employed a policy of some nature that caused the constitutional tort.191 A 
private hospital pursuing a claim against the state may be frustrated, as 
would a patient seeking to enjoin the state based in tort by a private 
hospital.192 
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court held: 
Local governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under section 
1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the 
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or 
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision 
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers. On 
the other hand . . . Congress did not intend municipalities to be 
held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of 
some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we 
conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because 
it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot 
be held liable under 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.193 
The Monell court conducted an exhaustive review of the legislative 
intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 before overruling its prior holding 
that municipalities have complete immunity under § 1983.194 Instead, the 
 
 189. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (noting that the language of 
§ 1983 imposes liability on local governments for constitutional deprivations through informal 
“custom,” such as activity where the government intervenes). 
 190. See id. In Monell, employees filed a § 1983 class action against the Board of Education 
and the City of New York, and individual officials, on an allegation that they were compelled to 
take unpaid leaves of absence (“LOA”) while pregnant for medical reasons though the LOAs at 
the time were not indicated. Id. at 660–61. 
 191. See id. at 691 (finding that a policy, either formally adopted or even custom of a 
government actor, creates § 1983 liability). 
 192. Id. at 690–91. 
 193. Id. at 659 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168 (1961)). 
 194. Id. at 667–91. 
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Court held in Monell that municipalities could be sued, but not held 
vicariously liable.195  
While the Monell court chose not to explore whether a private 
corporate employer may be exposed on a respondeat superior theory, other 
courts have held that a corporate employer may not face such exposure 
because of the torts of its employees.196 At least one court concluded that 
this general principle would undoubtedly apply in the context where a 
prisoner sued a private hospital in a § 1983 claim.197 In McIlwain v. Prince 
William Hospital, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
granted a hospital’s motion for summary judgment related to a prisoner’s 
claim that the hospital failed to inform him of a medical condition.198 The 
hospital emergency provider obtained an HIV test without the prisoner’s 
consent, the test came back positive, and a second provider for the 
correctional facility never informed the prisoner after the hospital physician 
had relayed the information.199 The prisoner alleged constitutional 
violations for failure to notify him of his positive test, thus depriving him of 
an opportunity to obtain treatment and resulting in personal harm and harm 
to his wife when he continued sexual relations.200  On the issue of the 
hospital, the court granted the motion for summary judgment, but allowed 
the contractual physician case to proceed due to disputed facts.201 The court 
noted that, unless a private hospital has a policy that violates § 1983 on a 
corporate level, the hospital could not be held liable for any of the acts of its 
employees or providers even if it is deemed a state actor for § 1983 
 
 195. See id. at 691 (concluding that the language of the statute supports that interpretation 
because it allows person B to become liable for A’s tort only if B “caused” A to subject the third 
party to the tort; a simple employee/employer relationship is not enough to create liability); see 
also Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding a private store 
not vicariously liable under § 1983 for acts of its employees); see Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 
678 F.2d 504, 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining that an individual who was beaten by a 
security guard could not recover from the guard’s employer); see Draeger v. Grand Central, Inc., 
504 F.2d 142, 146 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding a department store not liable for actions of an off duty 
police officer); see Estate of Iodice v. Gimbels, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1054, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(finding a department store not liable for false arrest by a security guard). 
 196. See McIlwain v. Prince William Hosp., 774 F. Supp. 986, 992 (E.D. Va. 1991) 
(dismissing claims against the hospital because no policy or custom led to the failure to tell the 
plaintiff about HIV test results, but allowing the claim against the doctor who possibly knew about 
the test results to proceed). 
 197. Id. at 992. 
 198. Id. at 987. 
 199. Id. at 988. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 992. 
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purposes.202 Such a conclusion further reduces the potential liability on a 
private hospital in the context of treating prisoners.203 
Of special note, however, the McIlwain court pointed out when the 
state might fall prey to a § 1983 claim based on the actions of a private 
hospital.204 In citing Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial Hospital, the 
McIlwain court referenced in dicta: “[A] state becomes responsible for the 
acts of a private party such as a hospital if the party “acts (1) in an 
exclusively state capacity, (2) for the state’s direct benefit, or (3) at the 
state’s specific behest.”205 
The implication of McIlwain, then, is that if the state charges a private 
hospital with performing certain activities at the state’s request, § 1983 
liability may attach.206 In essence, a nexus created by contract, exclusivity, 
or operationalizing a state-mandated or collaborated program may open the 
door to a claim against the state based on private action. 
C.   The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
In 1996, Congress effectively enacted a roadblock of sorts for 
prisoners wishing to file malpractice claims (or any civil claim for that 
matter) in federal court in the form of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”).207 PLRA was created in response to the volume of cases being 
brought by prisoners that effectively clogged the court system.208 The 
PLRA applies to civil actions brought by prisoners including those 
offenders housed in the military centers, juvenile facilities, drug treatment 
 
 202. McIlwain, 774 F. Supp. at 990. 
 203. Id. at 989. 
 204. Id. In Modaber, a physician claimed he was denied due process under the 14th 
Amendment by the hospital by revoking his staff privileges. Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial 
Hosp., Inc., 674 F.2d 1023, 1024 (4th Cir. 1982). The district court dismissed for failure to state a 
claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. Congruent with well-established precedent, the mere 
receipt of Hill-Burton federal funds was insufficient for a private hospital to be deemed a state 
actor. Id. at 1026–27.  
 205. McIlwain, 774 F. Supp. at 989 (quoting Modaber, 674 F.2d at 1025) (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994 ed. & Supp. II); see 
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). For a comprehensive analysis of the PLRA 
including an explication of judicial interpretations of each nuanced element see John Boston, “The 
Prison Litigation Reform Act” The Legal Aid Society Prisoner’s Rights Project (Feb. 27, 2006), 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Boston_PLRA_Treatise.pdf. 
 208. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). See also Porter v. 
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (noting that Congress passed the PLRA to limit the number of 
suits brought by prisoners and improve the quality of the issues before the court in addition to 
creating an administrative record). 
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residential houses, and private prisons.209 Courts are authorized under the 
statute to dismiss certain cases brought by prisoners: 
The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party 
dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions 
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a 
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility 
if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks 
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 
relief.210 
Courts have routinely applied this authority to medical malpractice 
claims, and the case law is vast regarding the various elements of the 
statute.211 Pursuant to the statute, a prisoner must exhaust all other 
administrative remedies prior to bringing an action.212 The case law 
surrounding “exhaustion” questions among other PLRA actions is nuanced 
and complex.213 For the purposes of this article, the reader should be aware 
that the statute was enacted to improve the quality of potential actions while 
at the same time provide an opportunity for custodians to address 
complaints by prisoners before seeking a judicial remedy.214 
V. CONCLUSION 
Prisoners at private hospitals are entitled to receive the same medical 
care as any other patient in the general population. Because of additional 
obligations of the government to oversee and ensure adequate health care, 
 
 209. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (2013). Of note, “Prisoner” is defined in subsection (h) as “[A]ny 
person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, 
probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (2013). Several cases 
have interpreted the scope of this definition to exclude both the deceased prisoner and relatives. 
See, e.g., Rivera-Quinones v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 397 F.2d 334, 339–40 (D.P.R. 2005) (interpreting 
the PLRA definition of prisoner to exclude deceased prisoners). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2013). 
 211. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”). See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3rd Cir. 2004) (noting that a prisoner’s 
allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation). 
 212. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013). 
 213. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 529–30 (2002) (analyzing the exhaustion requirement 
as it applies to the phrase from the statute “prison conditions” and noting that the meaning is not 
immediately clear cut). 
 214. See Kathryn F. Taylor, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Administrative Exhaustion 
Requirement: Closing the Money Damages Loophole, 78 WASH. U. L. REV. 955, 956 (2000) 
(noting that the law was passed to curb the dramatic number of frivolous lawsuits while also 
mandating administrative remedies be exhausted before a suit is filed). 
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the processes for assessing and treating prisoners are inherently encumbered 
by additional administrative needs to ensure that rights are not being 
violated at the same time the risks to the health care entity are mitigated. 
The prisoner simply has the right to consent to their own medical care, 
though the standard by which the penal system is accountable for ensuring 
care is rendered is not the same as for the general population.215 Prisoners 
are ethically entitled to donate and receive organ transplants;216 however, 
the policy governing the extent to which this is allowed is state-by-state.217 
Medical negligence is not enough for a prisoner to claim a constitutional 
violation, though an individual malpractice claim is an option against a 
private health care entity.218 In essence, for private hospitals and providers, 
the standards by which they would be held accountable would vary 
depending on the role at the time of health care delivery, and the type of 
action the prisoner files. 
 
 
 215. See supra section III.A. 
 216. See supra section III.C. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See supra section IV. 
